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UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS BETWEEN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, NATO ASPIRATIONS, AND THE RUSSIAN PRESSURE: THE PREMISES, CONSEQUENCES, AND LESSONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

Introduction. The article addresses the problem of Ukraine's non-alignment status and the evolution of its concept. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's subsequent independence in 1991 presented the newly sovereign state with significant strategic dilemmas concerning its national security and foreign policy orientation [1, p. 19]. Confronted with the competing influences of Russia and the West, Ukraine initially opted for a neutral stance, later evolving into a policy of non-alignment [25; 33]. This policy was conceived as a pragmatic approach to maintaining stability by avoiding entanglement in military-political alliances and balancing relations with both Eastern and Western powers.

At the time, Ukraine's foreign policy was characterized by multi-vectorism, with varying degrees of emphasis on Russian relations depending on the preferences of the political elites [10, pp. 123–124]. Although strategic documents outlined a transition from non-alignment to European and Euro-Atlantic integration [38], the policy under President Leonid Kuchma did not result in significant progress in this direction. Greater engagement with the EU and NATO occurred during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency, but it also fell short due to internal and external challenges [53, pp. 8–10]. This policy ultimately contributed to the election of Viktor Yanukovich in 2010, who abandoned Euro-Atlantic integration, reinstated non-alignment, and continued with the “facade” European integration [35].

Despite efforts to remain non-aligned, Ukraine became increasingly vulnerable to external threats, culminating in Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine [50, p. 12]. These events have raised critical questions about the effectiveness of non-alignment as a security strategy for Ukraine and its broader implications for regional stability.

After Russia's full-scale aggression in 2022, Ukrainian politics began debating abandoning Euro-Atlantic integration and returning to non-aligned status [55]. This debate arises from Russia's demands during invasion-related negotiations that Ukraine renounce NATO accession and restore non-aligned status [22]. While no talks are ongoing, history shows all conflicts end with negotiations, where

Ukraine's non-aligned status and potential abandonment of Euro-Atlantic and European aspirations may reemerge.

This study aims to test the hypothesis that Ukraine's non-aligned policy is not a deeply rooted tradition and has had, and could continue to have, detrimental effects on Ukrainian national security. To address this problem, the study will be guided by the following research question: How has Ukraine's non-aligned policy impacted its national security and geopolitical relations, and what are the implications of potentially reverting to this policy in the future?

Materials and methods. The components of the problem explored in this article have been analyzed to varying extents in prior scholarly publications of Hurak I., Kuzio T., Dragneva-Lewers R., Wolczuk K., Todorov I., Szeptycki A., Stępniewski T., Mironowicz E., Pryidun S., Hapeieva O., Sydoruk T., and Pavliuk V.

The literature review method established a foundation for understanding the broader context of neutrality and non-alignment, systematizing existing research to highlight key trends and debates. Document analysis assessed legislative acts and strategic documents to clarify Ukraine's official foreign policy trajectory. Historical analysis traced the development of Ukraine's non-aligned policy since 1991, focusing on the legal, political, and geopolitical factors that have shaped its course. The case study method enabled in-depth analysis of three pivotal periods: 1990–2004, 2005–2010, and 2010–2014. Policy analysis, employing a scenario planning approach, evaluated the potential strategic implications of Ukraine's non-alignment under varying geopolitical conditions. This method anticipated and assessed the risks and benefits of reverting to a non-aligned stance over short-term and long-term horizons. By integrating these methods, this study delivers a multidimensional analysis of Ukraine's non-aligned policy.

The theoretical basis of the research. A state holds the sovereign right to choose its security strategies, provided these align with international law. Among the options, neutrality and non-alignment have historically served as mechanisms to

reduce regional tensions and deter external threats [9, p. 26]. Neutrality focuses on non-participation in military-political blocs, opposing arms races, and fostering partnerships based on equality and mutual benefit [2, p. 105]. By contrast, non-alignment¹ offers greater flexibility, allowing states to avoid military alliances while still contributing to peace-keeping operations [17, p. 541; 31, pp. 153–154].

While neutrality and non-alignment share similarities in adapting states to external environment, they differ significantly in their constraints. Neutrality imposes strict limitations, such as prohibiting participation in armed conflicts and collective security arrangements. Non-alignment, however, can be declared unilaterally without requiring international recognition and adjusted over time to meet evolving geopolitical needs [31, pp. 153–154]. This distinction makes non-alignment a more adaptable policy in the modern era.

Ukraine's first Foreign Minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, observed that neutrality and non-alignment often converge in peacetime. Participation in international security institutions does not inherently contradict these principles unless a state actively engages in collective defense activities [31, pp. 153–154]. Some scholars argue that neutrality evolves into non-alignment, particularly as its focus narrows to a "military core" following the Cold War [17, pp. 556–560]. Critics, however, question the relevance of neutrality today, noting that the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928) and the United Nations Charter (1945) reduced the need for neutrality by prohibiting aggressive war and restricting the use of force to specific conditions [2, pp. 122–123].

Despite debates on its relevance, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged in 1955 as a coalition of states refusing to join military-political blocs. Today, NAM includes 120 member states and 17 observers, exerting significant influence on global politics [2, p. 106; 4, p. 5]. Ukraine, however, remains an observer of NAM, which confirmed that "the postulate of neutrality was employed for current policy purposes and lacked a solid, well-founded conceptual basis" [13; 2, p. 119].

The course of Ukraine's foreign policy in 1990–2004

Ukraine's neutrality was first declared in the "Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine" (1990), signaling its intention to adopt a neutral status in the future and abstain from joining military blocs [25]. However, this commitment was absent from later foundational documents, including Resolution "On declaration of independence of Ukraine" (1991) and Constitution (1996) [28; 39].

Non-alignment became a formal policy with the Military Doctrine of Ukraine (1993) [33]. This reflected a strategic balancing act: distancing from the USSR while avoiding integration into post-Soviet security structures. By refraining from fully aligning with either bloc, Ukraine sought to solidify its sovereignty and protect its independence. However, in the long term, the government aimed to strengthen ties with the West through bilateral and multilateral partnerships, envisioning these connections as a safeguard against reintegration into Russian-centric structures [5, p. 9].

In turn, the Law "On the Main Directions of Foreign Policy" (1993) advanced Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration, emphasizing participation in the European-wide security frameworks [38]. President Leonid Kuchma's first term prioritized a pro-Western course, highlighted by Ukraine's intent to seek EU associate membership, as declared at the EU-Ukraine summit in 1998 [29, p. 16]. This commitment was formalized in the "Strategy for Ukraine's Integration with the European Union" (1998) [23, p. 4; 36].

During Kuchma's second term, Ukraine adopted a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing European integration with closer ties to Russia. Factors driving this shift included economic reliance on Russia, Western criticism of Kuchma's administration, and stalled EU membership progress [19, pp. 186–187]. Despite these challenges, Ukraine reaffirmed its commitment to EU and NATO membership in the Law "On the Fundamentals of National Security" (2003) [37]. Nevertheless, contradictions emerged in Ukraine's strategic direction. While the Military Doctrine (2004) initially supported NATO accession, this goal was dropped by mid-2004 due to growing Western criticism of Kuchma and his political isolation [34; 14, p. 194].

The Orange Revolution later that year transformed Ukraine's foreign policy. Viktor Yanukovich, a candidate supported by Russia, lost the presidential election, undermining Moscow's influence [8, p. 103]. This marked a turning point, challenging Russia's strategy of reintegrating Ukraine into its sphere of influence and reshaping the regional power dynamic.

External and internal determinants of Viktor Yushchenko's foreign policy

After the Orange Revolution, NATO sent a clear signal of support for Ukraine's membership aspirations [16, p. 5]. In 2005, NATO granted Ukraine Intensified Dialogue status, focusing on democratic reforms, security improvements, and public engagement. Despite NATO's backing, including the open-door policy reaffirmed in 2006, Ukraine's path to the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) remained uncertain [6, p. 56; 11].

¹ In the subject literature, there are synonyms for the term "non-alignment," such as "non-affiliation," "freedom from alliances," "non-allied," "lack of bias," and "impartiality."

Moreover, in 2006, the planned “Sea Breeze” military exercises in Crimea² were met with significant internal protests, heavily supported by Russia [24, p. 86]. As a result, the exercises were canceled, damaging Ukraine’s relations with NATO and worsening public sentiment towards the Alliance [3; 30]. Nevertheless, Yushchenko persisted in aligning Ukraine with European and Euro-Atlantic security structures, which was reflected in the newly adopted National Security Strategy (2007) [42; 52].

Yushchenko’s foreign policy was hampered by internal political discord and foreign pressure. The rivalry between President and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko led to uncoordinated actions, particularly during crises: the Russia–Georgia war and gas disputes with Russia. These conflicts, combined with constitutional and institutional weaknesses, undermined Ukraine’s international standing, as highlighted in the European Parliament resolution (2010). Externally, Russia exerted pressure through economic conflicts and historical disputes, aiming to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. This culminated in direct accusations from the Russian president, who condemned Ukraine’s alleged anti-Russian stance [53, pp. 6–10].

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration efforts also encountered roadblocks. The EU offered no clear membership prospects, and critical socio-economic and judicial reforms remained incomplete. Euro-Atlantic integration faced domestic resistance, with opposition leader Yanukovich lobbying NATO against granting Ukraine the MAP in 2008³ [53, p. 9]. Though NATO reaffirmed its open-door policy at the Bucharest Summit that year, the MAP approval was deferred [12, p. 401]. Instead, Ukraine initiated Annual National Programs⁴, which replaced Annual Target Plans [53, p. 9].

By the end of Yushchenko’s presidency, progress toward EU and NATO membership was limited. While Western leaders expressed confidence in Ukraine’s potential, tangible advancements remained elusive, underscoring the challenges posed by internal divisions and external pressures [27, p. 18; 56, p. 20].

Ukraine’s non-aligned status during Viktor Yanukovich’s presidency and its consequences

Viktor Yanukovich’s election as Ukraine’s fourth president in 2010 signaled a crucial shift in the nation’s foreign policy direction [46]. Early in his presidency, Yanukovich promised a balanced and predictable approach to foreign relations, foster-

ing initial optimism for continued progress toward European integration [27, p. 18]. However, skepticism regarding Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions persisted, given Yanukovich’s explicit opposition to NATO membership during his campaign [8, p. 104; 48, pp. 19–20]. This skepticism deepened when, in July 2010, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the Law “On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy,” formalizing Ukraine’s non-aligned status [35]. This law effectively declared the country’s non-participation in military-political alliances, aligning with Yanukovich’s vision for a foreign policy that avoided NATO while still aspiring to EU membership. His administration also emphasized adherence to Ukraine’s non-aligned and non-nuclear status, embedding these principles into military strategy as part of a broader conflict-prevention framework [32].

Officially, Yanukovich’s administration maintained Ukraine’s non-aligned stance while emphasizing integration into the European political, economic, and legal space, with the ultimate goal of EU membership [35]. Cooperation with the EU aimed to deepen the strategic partnership and enhance participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, viewing EU membership as vital for Ukraine’s security. Instead, relations with NATO were based on the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (1997), focusing on constructive partnership through established mechanisms, joint working groups, and Annual National Programs for reforms, including military modernization. Meanwhile, strategic cooperation with Russia was prioritized, balancing national interests, addressing security threats, and advancing a pan-European collective security framework [41].

During Yanukovich’s presidency, Ukraine’s foreign policy trajectory was marked by an attempt to balance its relationships with NATO, the EU, and Russia, although these efforts often lacked consistency and coherence. The realities of Yanukovich’s foreign policy frequently diverged from the strategic objectives outlined in official documents. From 2010 to 2014, relations with the EU significantly deteriorated due to contentious domestic and foreign policy decisions, while cooperation with NATO remained largely declarative. This created a strategic opening for Russia to intensify efforts to draw Ukraine into its Eurasian sphere of influence.

From the onset of Yanukovich’s tenure, Ukrainian–Russian relations experienced a marked improvement, characterized by intensified cooperation across multiple spheres. The previously stagnant Ukrainian–Russian Commission resumed full-scale work, symbolizing the thaw in bilateral relations [8, pp. 104–105]. The Kharkiv Agreements (2010)⁵ epitomized this shift, extending the Russian

² The epicenter of the events was Feodosia, with demonstrations also spreading to Simferopol and Alushta.

³ On January 15, 2008, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Verkhovna Rada Chairman Arseniy Yatsenyuk jointly declared Ukraine’s intention to join the MAP.

⁴ These programs outlined specific actions and priorities for the state on its path to membership in NATO, making them similar to the MAP in both structure and content.

⁵ The Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.

Black Sea Fleet's lease in Crimea until 2042, with automatic five-year extensions unless contested by either party⁶ [51]. While officially consistent with non-alignment, the agreement raised security concerns and amplified Ukraine's dependence on Moscow [21, pp. 127–128]. Despite these concessions, unresolved issues persisted, and Russian elites continued to view Ukraine as an object of their own geopolitical interests [8, p. 106].

In 2013, conditions favored signing the EU Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. NATO's Annual National Program for 2013 also supported this agreement and visa liberalization with the EU [49, c. 116–117]. The Ukrainian government prepared to sign the agreement, prompting intensified pressure from Russia to highlight Ukraine's economic vulnerabilities [8, pp. 111–112]. However, unresolved issues hindered European integration, such as electoral reform, addressing selective justice, and implementing association agenda reforms. Tensions between Kyiv and Brussels escalated over the persecution of opposition leaders like Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Lutsenko, and Hryhoriy Filipchuk. Despite presidential pardons, judicial reform remained a major concern [54, p. 4].

The EU remained ready to sign the agreement at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius on November 28–29, 2013. However, Yanukovich abruptly refused, sparking national outrage. That same day, security forces violently dispersed protests in Kyiv, triggering the Revolution of Dignity. Yanukovich fled to Russia, and on February 22, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution removing him from power and calling early elections [40].

In retrospect, Yanukovich's foreign policy appeared inconsistent and strategically incoherent. Despite official rhetoric emphasizing balanced relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia, his administration's actions often diverged from these goals [43]. In reality, relations with key partners deteriorated, and EU aspirations remained limited to strategic documents, while deeper integration with Russia unfolded throughout his presidency.

Assessment of the potential reintroduction of Ukraine's non-aligned policy after Russia's full-scale invasion on Ukraine

Russia's aggression against Ukraine⁷, initiated in 2014 and escalated into a full-scale invasion in 2022, has brought the concept of non-alignment back into Ukraine's strategic discourse [47]. Professor Marek Madej of the University of Warsaw aptly warned that if a security vacuum is created

between NATO territory and Russia, there will be no buffer zone, because Russia will gradually catch up with such countries [7]. It is hard to disagree with this statement, because Vladimir Putin does not see Ukraine as an independent state, and its democracy directly threatens the Russian regime [45].

Ironically, Russia's actions have accelerated NATO enlargement rather than limiting it. Historically neutral Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, and Ukraine remains resolute in pursuing its European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions [15, p. 1]. As an EU candidate country, Ukraine continues negotiations toward full integration and has formally applied for NATO membership [20, p. 389]. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has also supported the idea of treating Ukraine as a NATO member in light of Russia's aggression [18]. De facto, NATO nations already recognize Ukraine as a member, leaving formal membership as the next step.

Amid negotiations to halt the invasion, Russia has demanded Ukraine's return to a non-aligned status, prompting debate within Ukraine [44]. Serhiy Dzherzh, chairman of Ukraine–NATO Civic League, warns against succumbing to pressure from Western politicians advocating non-alignment [57]. Sociological research confirms that Ukrainians overwhelmingly support NATO membership, with 49% favoring it as a post-war security cornerstone compared to only 8.5% supporting neutrality [26]. Reflecting on Ukraine's non-aligned policy from 2010 to 2014, its return appears unviable.

If Ukraine's integration into NATO or the EU is dismissed, two unfavorable non-alignment scenarios emerge: full non-alignment, leaving Ukraine as a buffer state, or partial non-alignment, where Ukraine integrates with the EU but not NATO. Both fail to meet Ukraine's security needs. Full non-alignment positions Ukraine precariously between NATO and Russia, while partial non-alignment offers economic integration but no military protection.

In the short term, non-alignment might ease peace negotiations by addressing Russia's primary demand. This could de-escalate hostilities, reduce immediate losses, and possibly involve temporary security guarantees. However, such an approach risks significant territorial or political concessions, undermining Ukraine's sovereignty. Russia's history of exploiting ceasefires suggests that non-alignment would only pause, not resolve, the conflict. Domestically, this shift could be seen as a betrayal, destabilizing Ukraine's political landscape. Alternatively, non-alignment might fail to stop hostilities altogether, emboldening further Russian aggression or demands, including demilitarization or tighter economic alignment with Moscow.

Long-term, non-alignment risks relegating Ukraine to a geopolitical "buffer state" vulnerable to ongoing Russian aggression. Buffer states often

⁶ As of October 31, 2024, this agreement remains in force for Ukraine.

⁷ In response to Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine abandoned its policy of non-alignment, officially revoking it in 2014, and, from 2019, enshrined its strategic course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration in its Constitution.

become battlegrounds rather than zones of stability. Without NATO's hard security guarantees, Ukraine would remain exposed to hybrid warfare, economic coercion, and military intervention. Non-alignment would also hinder Ukraine's economic development and sovereignty, isolating it from Western alliances and increasing its dependency on Russia. Belarus⁸ serves as a cautionary example of such dependency within Russia's sphere of influence.

A more optimistic scenario involves non-alignment paired with deep EU economic ties. While EU membership could bolster Ukraine's resilience through funding, trade, and reforms, it cannot substitute for NATO's military guarantees. Economic growth alone would not deter Russian aggression. This approach assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that Russia would not retaliate against Ukraine's EU integration. On the other hand, the worst-case scenario leaves Ukraine marginalized and strategically irrelevant. Without integration into NATO or the EU, Ukraine would lose leverage in international negotiations and face alienation from Western allies. Domestically, isolation could exacerbate political divisions, with non-alignment perceived as capitulation to Russia.

In conclusion, while non-alignment might offer short-term de-escalation, its benefits hinge on unreliable Russian compliance. In the long term, non-alignment fails to address Ukraine's security needs, leaving it economically, militarily, and politically vulnerable. Even with EU integration, non-alignment lacks the robust protections necessary for Ukraine's sovereignty and stability. NATO membership remains essential for Ukraine's comprehensive security.

Conclusions. Ukraine's foreign policy has undergone significant transformations since its independence, shaped by shifting geopolitical pressures and internal political dynamics. The analysis reveals that there has been no continuous tradition of neutrality or non-alignment in Ukraine; instead, its foreign policy orientation has been highly contingent on the preferences of political elites and the evolving international landscape. During the 1990–2004 period, Ukraine's foreign policy was characterized by multi-vectorism, a balancing act between Russian and Western influences. During his first term, President Leonid Kuchma pursued a pro-Western course, emphasizing European and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, in his second term, Kuchma's policies shifted noticeably toward a more Russia-centric approach. This dual foreign policy approach resulted in contradictions that hindered Ukraine's ability to solidify a clear geopolitical stance. The political instability and contradictory policy directions

during Kuchma's presidency set the stage for future foreign policy challenges.

The presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010), a staunch supporter of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, was marked by significant political problems both internally and externally. Domestically, there was persistent confrontation between various institutions of power, resulting in a lack of consensus on the country's foreign policy direction. Externally, Ukraine faced intense pressure from the Russian Federation and received insufficiently clear signals from the EU regarding its membership prospects. These challenges weakened Ukraine's strategic trajectory and its ability to achieve meaningful progress toward integration with Western institutions. Ultimately, these failures led to the coming to power of Yanukovich, who reinstated Ukraine's non-aligned policy.

Under Viktor Yanukovich (2010–2014), Ukraine's external orientation underwent significant changes. The government abandoned Euro-Atlantic ambitions and began a dual foreign policy focused on European integration and the development of a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Despite these stated objectives, the administration's actual focus shifted toward deeper involvement in the Eurasian space, aligning Ukraine more closely with Russian geopolitical ambitions. This approach led to a deterioration of relations with both the EU and Russia, halting Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Analyzing the foreign policy of this period reveals a fundamental mismatch between the leadership's actions and the objectives outlined in Ukraine's strategic documents. The declared non-alignment failed to achieve either stability or meaningful progress in strengthening Ukraine's international partnerships.

The analysis underscores the inadequacy of non-alignment as a sustainable policy for Ukraine. Historically, non-alignment limited Ukraine's activity in the international arena, turning it into a "buffer state" vulnerable to exploitation by Russia. Whether full or partial non-alignment is pursued, neither scenario offers the comprehensive security guarantees necessary to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and facilitate its development. Furthermore, the potential risks of future non-alignment far outweigh its benefits. While it might temporarily de-escalate hostilities and facilitate peace negotiations, such agreements would likely involve significant territorial or political concessions to Russia. Moreover, history shows that Russia often exploits cease-fires to regroup militarily. Non-alignment would fail to address Ukraine's long-term security needs, leaving it diplomatically marginalized, economically isolated, and politically vulnerable. In both the short and long term, non-alignment creates vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit.

⁸ Prior to the amendments to the Belarusian Constitution on February 27, 2022, Article 18 stated that "the Republic of Belarus aims to make its territory a nuclear-free zone and its state neutral."

Therefore, rejecting proposals for non-alignment and prioritizing stronger ties with the EU and NATO is the most viable strategy for ensuring Ukraine's security and sovereignty. The Euro-Atlantic security framework offers the guarantees needed to counter external threats and secure Ukraine's future, reinforcing its position as a key player in European security.

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Summary

Suprun V. R. Ukraine's foreign policy dilemmas between European integration, NATO aspirations, and the Russian pressure: the premises, consequences, and lessons of non-alignment. – Article.

This article critically explores Ukraine's historical and contemporary adherence to the principles of neutrality and non-alignment, tracing their evolution since the nation gained independence. The research is guided by the hypothesis that Ukraine's non-aligned policy has not been a deeply rooted tradition but rather a pragmatic choice shaped by shifting political contexts, and that it has had, and could continue to have, detrimental effects on Ukraine's security. To address this, the article employs a combination of qualitative research methods, including literature review method, historical analysis, document analysis, and case study examination of three pivotal periods: 1990–2004, 2005–2010, and 2010–2014. Additionally, policy analysis incorporating scenario planning evaluates the risks and benefits of a potential return to non-alignment under different geopolitical conditions.

To establish a robust theoretical foundation, the concepts of “neutrality” and “non-alignment” are examined in depth, with particular attention to their distinctions and relevance within international relations theory. The analysis investigates the historical roots of Ukraine's commitment to these policies, the factors driving the re-adoption of non-alignment in 2010, and the operationalization of this stance between 2010 and

2014. Furthermore, the study evaluates the strategic consequences of non-alignment for Ukraine's national security and its interactions with key geopolitical actors, including Russia, the European Union, and NATO. In light of the 2014 crisis and the subsequent full-scale Russian aggression in 2022, the article provides a nuanced assessment of whether a return to non-alignment aligns with Ukraine's current security imperatives and long-term strategic interests.

The findings reveal that non-alignment has historically weakened Ukraine's position, leaving it vulnerable to external threats, particularly from Russia, while failing to provide adequate security guarantees. In the context of Russia's ongoing full-scale aggression, non-alignment remains an unviable strategy, as it would only exacerbate Ukraine's security vulnerabilities. Thus, deeper integration with NATO and the EU is the most viable path for Ukraine's long-term stability and sovereignty.

Key words: Ukraine, foreign policy, national security, non-alignment, neutrality, security and defense policy, Russian threat, Russian pressure.

Анотація

Супрун В. Р. Зовнішньополітичні дилеми України між європейською інтеграцією, прагненнями до НАТО та тиском Росії: передумови, наслідки й уроки позаблоковості. – Стаття.

Ця стаття критично аналізує історичну та сучасну прихильність України до принципів нейтралітету та позаблоковості, простежуючи їхній розвиток з моменту здобуття державою незалежності. Дослідження ґрунтується на гіпотезі, що політика позаблоковості України не була глибоко вкоріненою традицією, а радше прагматичним вибором, сформованим у змінних політичних умовах, і що вона мала й може надалі мати негативний вплив на безпеку України. Для перевірки цієї гіпотези стаття використовує комплекс якісних дослідницьких методів, зокрема огляд літератури, історичний аналіз, аналіз документів, а також кейс-стаді трьох ключових періодів: 1990–2004, 2005–2010 та 2010–2014 років. Крім того, аналіз політики, що включає планування сценаріїв, оцінює ризики та переваги потенційного повернення до позаблокового статусу за різних геополітичних умов.

Для створення ґрунтовної теоретичної бази детально розглядаються поняття «нейтралітет» і «позаблоковість», з особливою увагою до їхніх відмінностей і значення в контексті теорії міжнародних відносин. Аналіз досліджує історичні корені зобов'язань України дотримуватися цих політик, фактори, що зумовили повторне прийняття політики позаблоковості у 2010 році, а також реалізацію цього підходу в період з 2010 по 2014 роки. Крім того, дослідження оцінює стратегічні наслідки позаблоковості для національної безпеки України та її взаємодії з ключовими геополітичними акторами, включаючи Росію, Європейський Союз і НАТО. У світлі кризи 2014 року та подальшої повномасштабної російської агресії у 2022 році стаття надає всебічну оцінку доцільності повернення до позаблоковості у контексті сучасних імперативів безпеки та довгострокових стратегічних інтересів України.

Результати дослідження показують, що позаблоковість історично послаблювала позиції України, роблячи її вразливою до зовнішніх загроз, зокрема з боку Росії, і водночас не забезпечувала належних гарантій безпеки. В умовах триваючої повномасштабної російської агресії позаблоковість залишається нежиттєздатною стратегією, яка лише посилить без-

пекову вразливість України. Відтак, глибша інтеграція з НАТО та ЄС є найефективнішим шляхом для забезпечення довгострокової стабільності та суверенітету України.

Ключові слова: Україна, зовнішня політика, національна безпека, позаблоковість, нейтралітет, політика безпеки і оборони, російська загроза, російський тиск.